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As with many landmark decisions, the importance of the opinion
in the Filartiga v. Pena-Irala1 case has little to do with the parties
involved. Assuming the Filartigas ultimately were able to obtain a
judgment on the merits, its enforceability against the defendant in
Paraguay seems problematical at best. On a practical level, the ap-
proval by a United States court of subject matter jurisdiction in
this case may provide inspiration for suits against alleged foreign
torturers exiled in this country or just passing through at an un-
timely moment, but it seems unlikely to offer torture victims and
their families much in the way of a satisfactory remedy against
such acts.
Nevertheless, the decision is most significant. Supported by a
competent analysis of the developing general usage and practice
of nations, the court's holding "that deliberate torture perpetrated
under color of official authority violates universally accepted
norms of the international law of human rights, regardless of the
nationality of the parties"' is an important contribution to the
growing weight of authority acknowledging the legal status of in-
ternational standards governing basic human rights. Equally im-
portant from a broader perspective is the recognition by a domes-
tic court that international law transcends sovereign boundaries
to protect individuals from their own government officials.
Only rarely is an American court called upon to interpret the
"law of nations," particularly areas of such law that must be ascer-
tained from the evolving sources of customary international law.
In a modern municipal legal system where the law governing most
issues is found in statutory codes and court reporters, domestic
courts are presented with no small challenge when confronted
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with issues governed by a decentralized system of law that does
not fit into our "black letter" tradition. The Supreme Court in
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,3 for example, refused to
rule on the validity of an act of a foreign government under cus-
tomary international law "in the absence of a treaty or other un-
ambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles."4
The difficulty of the task is made more obvious by the wide var-
iance among academic specialists in the field in approaching the
sources of international law. On one end of the spectrum are the
heirs of Austinian positivism who hold a restrictive view of the
role of law in international society, limiting it to issues clearly
governed by treaties or customary rules of classical origin. At the
other end are the policy-science lawyers of the "New Haven" or
McDougal school, who view international law not as a body of ex-
isting rules but rather as a process of decision-making in which
law is defined so as to promote policies favorable to subjectively
chosen world community interests. Both of these approaches,
strictly applied, are apt to lead to legal principles without political
validity-the first because its narrow search neglects the develop-
ing nature of international law and the latter because its value
orientation lacks the degree of objectivity and predictability nec-
essary for sound legal analysis.
In Filartiga, the court took a middle ground approach which,
while referencing the traditional sources, relied prominently upon
United Nations General Assembly Resolutions - a source many
authorities would give far less consideration. The court first
acknowledged the hortatory nature of the United Nations Charter
provisions promoting "universal respect for, and observance of,
human rights and fundamental freedoms. . . ."I Noting also that
there is no definitive statement as to the extent of the "human
rights and fundamental freedoms" promoted in the Charter, the
court observed that "there is no dissent from the view that the
[Charter] guaranties include, at a bare minimum, the right to be
free from torture."' As evidence that this prohibition is now part
of customary international law, the court cited language from two
General Assembly Resolutions-the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights7 and the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons
' 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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from Being Subjected to Torture.8
In relying on these Declarations, which were adopted by the
General Assembly without dissent, the court obviously was at-
tempting to find a codified statement of the often nebulous law
represented by the usage and practice of nations. It declared that
these "U.N. Declarations are significant because they specify with
great precision the obligations of member nations. under the
Charter."9 Although it may be true that the rights and duties
prescribed in them have become part of customary international
law, the authority that the court impliedly gives these Declara-
tions is subject to question. Standing alone, General Assembly
Resolutions (even those adopted unanimously) have no binding
force among the member nations. They are not law, only evidence
of it. Their provisions must be balanced against other pro-
nouncements of state practice, which may or may not be consis-
tent with a given resolution.
To its credit, the court cited numerous expressions of interna-
tional renunciation of official torture in addition to United Nations
Resolutions. Two regional conventions on human rights among the
Organization of American States and among the members of the
Council of Europe are referenced, as well as the prohibitions
against torture found in the constitutions of fifty-five nations, in-
cluding the United States and Paraguay. It also cited State
Department surveys noting the international consensus recogniz-
ing the validity of governmental obligations with respect to
human rights and the absence of claims by governments of a right
to torture their citizens.
What is missing from the court's recitation of state practice is,
however, any mention of the reaction of the international com-
munity when a state blatantly commits human rights violations.
International custom, under article 38 of the Statute of the Inter-
national Court of Justice, is recognized as a source of international
law only to the extent that it is "evidence of a general practice ac-
cepted as law."1 States, like individuals, often are willing to en-
dorse a statement of good intentions, so long as they do not expect
to be affected adversely by it. An important inquiry, therefore, is
whether the statements found in the cited General Assembly
Resolutions, regional conventions, and national constitutions are
representative of a practice among nations that is accepted as
G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34), U.N. Doc. A/1034 (1975).
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law. The fact that the governments of most nations apparently do
not commit acts of torture is some evidence that the prohibition is
accepted by them as international law, but there are many purely
domestic reasons for a government not to torture its citizens.
The more telling. evidence that the prohibition has been ac-
cepted as international law is the censure rendered by the world
community against regimes in violation of it. Although this sanc-
tion is applied unevenly in our multipolar international legal
system, it can often be very effective. The regimes of "Emperor"
Bokassa and Idi Amin, to mention only the most obvious, suffered
fatally from the international ostracism imposed principally be-
cause of their human rights violations. Violations by the Soviet
Union, both domestically and in Afghanistan, have been
acknowledged by vigorous disapprobation which, while perhaps
having little appreciable corrective affect, is evidence of interna-
tional acceptance of the legal status of human rights standards.
The point here is not that the application of sanctions is sine qua
non to the existence of a law -it is not. The point is, rather, that
the court's argument establishing official torture as a violation of
international law would have been more convincing had it offered
evidence of a practice among nations of applying the sanctions
that usually accompany such violations.
In addition to the contribution the Filartiga opinion makes to
the growing body of human rights law, the court's decision to re-
ject its own dictum to the effect that "violations of international
law do not occur when the aggrieved parties are nationals of the
acting state"" may be even more significant. This dictum, recited
by the court only four years earlier and relied upon by the lower
court in refusing jurisdiction, represented the classical view that
public international law was in fact "interstate" law and governed
only the actions of state actors among themselves. Any attempt to
invoke the application of international rights and duties vis a vis a
recognized government and its nationals was viewed as an unlaw-
ful interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state. Al-
though this view has suffered much erosion in this century, it is
still widely accepted and is the principal defense asserted against
international claims of the type involved in Filartiga.
For a domestic court to acknowledge international rights in the
realm of domestic affairs -albeit the domestic affairs of another
nation -is bound to impact upon the validity of claims based on in-
" 630 F.2d at 884.
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ternational rights and obligations beyond those involved in this
case. The most obvious of these is the right of self-determination.
This right has enjoyed a developing evolution of acceptance simi-
lar in pattern to that of international human rights. It is referred
to as a guiding principle in the United Nations Charter; it has
been acknowledged in a number of General Assembly Resolutions
(the most important of which being the unanimously adopted
Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friend-
ly Relations and Co-operation among States 2 ); and it has a history
of acceptance in state practice. The right of self-determination has
been applied most often in the effort to decolonize the developing
world, but by definition it has broader relevance and has been as-
serted effectively within the municipal boundaries of non-colonial
states-witness, Bangladesh. Conceivably, a class action tort suit
could be brought under the Alien Tort Statute13 against a foreign
official for unilaterally denying political status to a class of people
in his country. Admittedly, there remains some disagreement
among authorities as to the exact nature of the right as it actually
exists in customary international law, and the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity would bar most private actions based on the right
no matter how it is defined. Regardless of whether it can be judi-
cially enforced in a national court, the right of self-determination
and other international rights traditionally subordinated to inter-
national principles proclaiming the inviolability of state sover-
eignty have been enhanced by the Filartiga decision.
While giving due recognition to the important statements made
by the court on issues of universal application, one must admit to
finding the case somewhat peculiar from a political standpoint.
Traditionally, questions concerning acts of a public nature commit-
ted by foreign officials with respect to foreign nationals within
foreign state boundaries would be well beyond the scope of an
American court's desired realm of authority. Based upon prin-
ciples of international comity and in deference to the constitu-
tionally prescribed role of the executive branch in conducting
foreign affairs, courts usually avoid passing judgment on such acts
even when directed against United States citizens. The role of the
act of state doctrine in providing a rationale for judicial abstention
on international political issues has diminished substantially in re-
cent years. Yet, as noted in the Sabbatino decision, the doctrine
" G. A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) 121, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962).
,3 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976).
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continues to have vitality to the extent of "its capacity to reflect
the proper distribution of functions between the judicial and
political branches of the Government on matters bearing upon
foreign affairs.""4 The Supreme Court there observed that "some
aspects of international law touch more sharply on national nerves
than do others,""u indicating that some issues remain on which
judicial abstention may be appropriate.
The issues involved in Filartiga are certainly of a politically
sensitive nature. The mere fact that the court asserted jurisdic-
tion over a case involving the acts of a foreign official with no im-
mediate American interest involved is bound to evoke resentment
abroad as an act of moral imperialism. Nonetheless, it is difficult
to fault the court's careful legal analysis in assuming jurisdiction
in this case-given the rather odd statute on which it was based.
The court found ample precedent for application of international
law by a United States court and documented well that tort claims,
transitory by nature, often are adjudicated outside the jurisdic-
tion where they arise. Because the act of state doctrine was not
argued below, that issue was not before the court on appeal. The
court, however, noted in passing that "we doubt whether action
by a state official in violation of the Constitution and Laws of the
Republic of Paraguay, and wholly unratified by that nation's
government, could be characterized as an act of state."u6 It must
also have been comforting for the court to have had the strong en-
couragement for assuming jurisdiction provided in the amicus
brief submitted by the Departments of State and Justice.
On balance, the treatment of international issues by domestic
judicial authorities should be welcomed as a positive development.
There is little enough discussion of such issues by the interna-
tional judiciary; a larger role adopted by the various national
courts in dealing with international problems can only enhance
the role of international law in resolving such problems. Subject-
ing politically sensitive questions -whether international or do-
mestic-to objective legal analysis can often have the effect of
relaxing the emotional tensions that produce political conflict.
It is hoped that other courts will follow the lead of the Second
Circuit in this decision and not seek out means, as many courts
have, to avoid jurisdiction on issues such as those involved in this
case. The only worry is that Filartiga may be more of an aberra-
" Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427-28.
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tion than an innovation. The application of the Alien Tort Statute
is obviously limited, and the amicus briefs of the executive depart-
ments may well be less supportive of the court's decision the next
time this statute is interpreted, particularly in view of the Reagan
Administration's shift in foreign policy away from an emphasis on
human rights. The court concluded its opinion with the statement
that its holding "is a small but important step in the fulfillment of
the ageless dream to free all people from brutal violence."' 7 Vic-
tims of torture, as well as those of us who wish to see law assume
a larger role in international affairs, can only hope that this does
not prove to be an overstatement.
'7 Id. at 890.

